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Protection of human rights, according to Russian law, is the first duty of the security and 
intelligence services of the post-Soviet state. Even more, the "special services" or 
"organs," as they are called, are under new legal checks and balances to minimize 
abuse and maximize accountability. This dramatic break with the totalitarian past is 
intended to help institutionalizing democratic and market reforms by ensuring that the 
secret police and spy agencies never again abuse citizens of the Russian Federation, 
threaten the integrity of the government, or earn Moscow pariah status in what a former 
Russian intelligence chief calls the "civilized world."
How well do these grandly stated intentions conform with reality? The failed Soviet 
putsch of August 1991 portended the end not only of the Communist Party and its 
Committee for State Security (KGB), but the impunity that went with them. Indeed, 
Vadim Bakatin, the former USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, ousted in 1990 at KGB 
Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov's insistence, refused to accept the job as Kryuchkov's 
successor until a reluctant Mikhail Gorbachev gave him written authority to dismember--
not merely reform--the KGB. (1)
Some observers draw benign conclusions about Russian state security today by 
contrasting it with the Stalinist terror or Brezhnev's stagnant totalitarianism. This is a 
false comparison. No serious economist would measure the Russian economy of 1997 
with the Soviet economy of 1938 as a standard. Nor could one usefully attempt to 
gauge political reform with the dark Brezhnev years of one-party rule. The logical 
benchmark lies among the Western norms promised and expected in 1991.
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The Bakatin Interregnum
In the months following the putsch, Bakatin threw the KGB into turmoil as he splintered 
it into five separate services at the top and ceded power from the Soviet center to Boris 
Yel'tsin's Russian Federation and the 11 other remaining union republics. He ordered 
officers to cooperate with five separate state investigations of the putsch and of KGB 
misdeeds; one of the probes was led by former dissidents and gulag survivors.(2) He 
initiated a series of high-level firings and promised "hundreds or thousands" more. 
Senior KGB officers, seeing Kryuchkov in prison, feared similar fates for themselves. 
The Moscow city KGB seemed to be a bellwether for the rest of the apparatus: its new 
chief, appointed by a reformist mayor, was Yevgeni Savostyanov, an associate of 
dissident leader Andrei Sakharov.
By his own admission, Bakatin was a product of the Communist Party apparatus, and 
his actions must be seen in that context. It was his idea, for example, to name Yevgeni 
Primakov as foreign intelligence chief, viewing Primakov as one of the few other 
members of Gorbachev's presidential council who opposed the putsch and one of the 
only high-level Soviet officials with substantive foreign policy experience. He also had 
no intention of tearing up the KGB in its entirety and starting anew as Vaclav Havel had 
done in the Czech Republic. He thought that, with fresh leadership, the security apparat 
could be reformed.(3)
Nevertheless, Bakatin was by far the most liberal chief of any of Moscow's secret 
services, before or since. Though lacking a blueprint to carry out what he wanted to do--
he never expected to be in such a position--he envisioned a three-directional plan of 
action: "disintegration" or dismemberment of the KGB into independent functional 
components, "decentralization" to hand power to the union republics across the USSR 
and the major regions within the Russian Federation, and "de-ideologization." Many 
interpret the latter as de-politicizing the organs of its Communist Party affiliation, but 
Bakatin's plan went much further: "the repudiation of the ideology of Chekism," the cult-
like self-identity of the organs as the historical successors to the Bolshevik Cheka. (4)
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Bakatin also committed the ultimate crime against the chekists: He attempted genuine 
cooperation with the United States. In an historic gesture that earned him the 
permanent enmity of the organs and of many politicians, Bakatin met with the American 
ambassador to Moscow and turned over to him the KGB blueprints of the massive 
electronic eavesdropping system implanted in the structure of the new American 
Embassy building. The legacy of political repression and covert warfare against Western 
democracies, he declared, was over.
Yel'tsin's approach
Too closely identified with Gorbachev and reviled by most of the state security 
leadership, Bakatin had no place in the independent Russian government of Boris 
Yel'tsin. Bakatin was handy for Yel'tsin's purposes in breaking up the Soviet apparatus 
and transferring power to the Russian Federation, but without a political party of his 
own, Yel'tsin required support from the organs to deal with his many enemies. Instead of 
building new security institutions, Yel'tsin merely re-named and reorganized the old KGB 
structures (see sidebar 1).
At the same time, the Russian leader kept the internal security services in a constant 
state of flux by continuous bureaucratic reorganization, creation of new security and 
intelligence agencies, and frequent top-level personnel changes. The principal internal 
security organ, the Federal Security Service (FSB), underwent six name changes and 
six leadership changes in six years. Part of this state of uncertainty has been caused by 
Yel'tsin's byzantine form of divide-and-rule governing, but at least an equal part is due to 
clan warfare within the power structures and ruling elite.
While Yel'tsin recruited young, visionary economists--whatever their shortcomings--from 
far outside his inner circle to implement a Western-style reform with the advice of 
hundreds of American experts, he assembled a state security team of KGB 
professionals and personal cronies. His first security minister, MVD General Viktor 
Barannikov, immediately sought to merge the former KGB internal security organs with 
the MVD in what critics across the political spectrum denounced as a return to a Stalin-
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era repressive machine.(5) The chief of his personal guard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, built 
up his own security empire complete with its own intelligence service and business 
operations.
Similarly, old traditions were preserved. Yel'tsin's first state security initiative, re-naming 
the USSR KGB components and placing them under his authority, was contained in a 
set of decrees postdated to take effect on 20 December 1991, "Chekists' Day," in 
observance of the founding of the Cheka on that same date in 1917. The Cheka sword 
and shield remain the crest of the main internal security organ, the Federal Security 
Service, as well as of the External Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD), and the State Procuracy. Along with those symbols survived the chekist 
mentality of impunity.
Newly built checks and balances were short-lived. The new Constitutional Court, albeit 
backed overwhelmingly by public opinion, posed the first major resistance to re-
centralization of the organs. Yel'tsin ultimately abolished it. The Russian Federation 
Supreme Soviet had a Committee on Defense and Security headed by Sergei 
Stepashin, a former MVD officer who initially endorsed reforms. Yel'tsin disbanded the 
parliament and laid siege to it in October 1993. The subsequently elected parliaments 
proved far more politically backward than the Supreme Soviet, and though the new laws 
governing the security organs paid tribute to human rights, in fact they ceded power to 
the services themselves. The present Federal Assembly has funded the organs rather 
generously with an $8.8 billion appropriation for 1997, which is triple the federal budget 
for science and agriculture and nearly equal to the combined outlays for industry, power 
engineering, and construction.(6)
Public demands for order in the face of sharply increased violence and crime 
overshadowed the post-putsch sentiment that ran so heavily against the organs. Yel'tsin 
and parliament incrementally broadened the powers of security services to conduct 
surveillance and even arrest and detain individuals. These periodic increases in chekist 
power were tolerated in the name of waging war on street crime, organized crime, 
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government corruption, and terrorist violence. As if these reasons were insufficient, the 
organs--often fueled from above by inflammatory pronouncements by Yel'tsin himself--
declared Russia to be under espionage attack from the West and initiated a new 
campaign against "traitors" and "spies."
WHERE THE FORMER KGB IS TODAY
Federal Security Service (FSB). Having gone through numerous name changes and 
bureaucratic reshuffles in the past six years, the FSB contains most of the internal 
security components of the KGB.
Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). The 
high-tech signals intelligence service was formed by a merger of the KGB Eighth Chief 
Directorate and the 16th Directorate. FAPSI also controls new fiber optic 
telecommunications networks, registers securities transactions, provides private 
companies with encryption software, and, in St. Petersburg, controls electronic pagers.
External Intelligence Agency (SVR). The SVR is the re-named First Chief Directorate 
of the USSR KGB, responsible for espionage activity and analysis abroad.
Federal Border Service. This independent organ was the KGB Border Guards Chief 
Directorate.
Federal Guard Service. Set up in August 1996 to absorb the presidential praetorian 
guard run by ousted Gen. Aleksandr Korzhakov, the Federal Guard Service contains 
numerous former KGB and other units to provide physical security for Russian leaders 
and public buildings.
State Tax Police. This revenue-collecting service was established with a large number 
of officers from the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate, the political police branch of the KGB 
responsible for hunting down dissidents.
Checklist
A checklist of major topics helps gauge the direction the organs have taken since the 
Bakatin reforms. The first standard, human rights, is based on Article 1 of the Law on 
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Security that requires the organs to safeguard the human rights of all citizens of the 
Russian Federation, and Article 2 of the Constitution which stipulates that the protection 
of "the human being, his rights and freedoms" is one of the state's "highest values." The 
second standard is how well the organs adhere to the rule of law and defend the 
transitioning political system and economy against corruption and organized crime.
Human Rights
• Harassment and defamation of critics. The organs began harassing and 
defaming critics in early 1993, when a group of former dissidents led by former 
political prisoner Sergei Grigoryants began a series of international conferences 
called "KGB Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." Security officials telephoned 
political figures in an attempt to intimidate them from participating. Provocateurs 
disrupted the original proceedings, and some of the organizers were subjected to 
physical harm.(7) The following year, counterintelligence chief Sergei Stepashin 
lashed out publicly at "enemies" in the Democratic Russia movement and in the 
press, and branded a retired KGB general and a prominent human rights activist 
as "terrorists" for their roles in the conferences.(8)
• Legal persecution of critics. In what was widely viewed as a "revenge" case, the 
FSB in 1995 brought charges against former KGB Captain Viktor Orekhov, who 
had spent seven years in a forced labor camp after having been caught warning 
dissidents of their impending arrest.(9) Ex-dissident Valeria Novodvorskaya was 
charged in 1996 with "promoting inter-ethnic strife," brought to court where her 
writings were dissected by a former KGB colonel, and denied the right to travel 
abroad where she sought treatment for asthma.(10) That same year, retired Navy 
Captain Aleksandr Nikitin was charged with "treason" for having helped a 
Norwegian environmental group to write an open-source report on atomic waste in 
the Arctic Ocean. He was also subjected to an official campaign to destroy his 
reputation. After long consideration, Amnesty International announced in 1996 that 
with the persecution of Nikitin, Russia was again arresting prisoners of conscience.
(11)
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• Extrajudicial persecution of critics. In January 1993, human rights lawyer 
Tatiana Kuznetsova, an attorney for Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and other dissidents, 
was preparing for the first conference on the "KGB Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow" when she received a call from the state security office in Kaluga. 
Officials told her they wanted to return documents illegally seized from one of her 
clients, dissident Sergei Grigoryants, during the Soviet period. En route to the 
meeting, Kuznetsova drove into an ambush in which her car was forced over an 
embankment. She suffered severe head injuries.(12) In August 1994, Grigoryants 
was ambushed in his apartment building and subjected to a severe, professionally 
executed beating that ultimately cost him an eye.(13)
• Curtailed freedom of the press. Freedom of the press to report on excesses of 
the organs arguably peaked in 1992 and 1993. While the decline in press freedom 
is primarily due to other factors such as the political connections of media owners, 
much of the unofficial intimidation is attributable to current and former state 
security officers involved in either the parent enterprise or corruption.(14) The MVD 
and security organs conducted a far-reaching harassment campaign against 
journalists covering the Chechnya war, arresting hundreds and confiscating notes, 
tapes, photographs, and equipment.(15)
• Restrictions on religious freedom. Less religious freedom exists in 1997 than in 
1991. Even before President Yel'tsin signed a law limiting religious freedoms, 
regional governments were "restoring one of the most virulent institutions of the 
Soviet era, the Council for Religious Affairs" and began telling Catholic and other 
clergy that they were forbidden to celebrate Mass.(16) While this crackdown was 
initiated in the State Duma, its main champion was Aleksi II, patriarch of Moscow 
and All Russia, who claimed it would preserve the Orthodox Church. Aleksi and 
others in the hierarchy collaborated closely with the KGB, even against Orthodox 
Christians who chose to worship underground. The patriarchate is enabling the 
former KGB collaborators to silence or repress critics.(17)
• Torture. Moscow committed itself to outlaw torture when it signed the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1996. Yet that same year, presidential decrees 
granted authorities more legal grounds to torture prisoners.(18) In April 1997, 
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Amnesty International issued a follow-on report documenting what it described as 
widespread, systematic torture throughout the Russian Federation "in police 
custody, in pre-trial detention, prisons and the army." Torture techniques include 
suffocation, forcing prisoners to wear gas masks injected with irritants, and beating 
of prisoners suspended from ceilings with their hands tied behind their backs.(19)
• Murder. Not a single Soviet-era official has been held accountable for human 
rights abuses, a fact that adds to the sense of impunity permeating the organs. The 
January 1996 termination of the probe to find the murderers of Father Aleksandr 
Men, a Soviet-era dissident priest, showed the lack of political will to bring closure 
to the ugliest parts of modern Russian history. His killers are believed to have been 
with the KGB.
One must be especially cautious when imputing murder to the state security services as 
institutions when Russia is embroiled in such lawlessness. However, a pattern seems to 
emerge. The October 1994 assassination of investigative journalist Dmitri Khodolov is 
an example because of the known involvement of an active-duty state security officer. 
Khodolov was probing high-level corruption within the Ministry of Defense and was 
cultivating a Federal Counterintelligence Service officer as a source. He told a colleague 
that the officer, a confidential source he did not identify, directed him to pick up a satchel 
containing secret documents compromising top military officials. The satchel was 
booby-trapped, and Khodolov was killed.
The Chechnya war had hardly begun when the Sergei Grigoryants family faced its 
harshest persecution ever. Grigoryants and his wife had persevered through the low-
level harassment and beating during his series of conferences on the KGB, and now 
were planning a campaign to hold officials accountable for war crimes in Chechnya. On 
or about 19 January 1995, Grigoryants received a telephonic warning that his son, 
Timofei, would be murdered. Three days later, Timofei Grigoryants was struck and killed 
by a hit-and-run automobile in the driveway of the family apartment building. 
Grigoryants subsequently filed suit to force the government to investigate the crime. The 
authorities' behavior suggested government involvement when two officials approached 
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Grigoryants with an offer to arrange for the return of his writers' union building if he 
would drop the case. Grigoryants refused. French authorities were apparently 
persuaded of official involvement; President Jacques Chirac quickly granted political 
asylum to Grigoryants' wife and daughter, though Grigoryants himself remains active in 
Moscow.(20)
According to a US military intelligence report, the FSB set up a special covert unit to 
assassinate political opponents inside the Russian Federation in 1995, aimed 
particularly at Chechen separatist leaders. The 40- to 50-man unit is believed 
responsible for the April 1995 assassination of Chechen security chief Sultan 
Geliskhanov.(21) The FSB is also reported to have set up Fred Cuny, an American relief 
worker in Chechnya, to be killed by spreading disinformation that he was a spy. The 
FSB and other agencies obstructed Cuny's family and friends from searching for him 
after he disappeared in early 1995.(22) GRU military intelligence ran a separate 
operation in April 1996 to assassinate Chechen President Djokhar Dudayev.(23)
Fighting corruption and organized crime
The MVD, though itself riddled with corruption, has borne the brunt of whatever major 
anti-crime operations exist, and hundreds of officers have been killed in the line of duty. 
Even so, despite the MVD's efforts and the organs' sweeping powers, government 
corruption and organized crime ballooned out of control. Neither the president, his prime 
minister, nor the parliament have demonstrated the political will to combat the problem 
at its roots. After referring to his country as the "biggest mafia state in the world" and a 
"superpower of crime" in 1994, Yel'tsin acknowledged in his State of the Federation 
speech of 1997, "we have declared war on economic crime and corruption but not 
started it for real."(24)
Nor is the anti-crime campaign a simple law enforcement issue. FSB Director Nikolai 
Kovalev said in late 1996 that he would fight crime not with the immense powers 
allowed by law, but with a "sword of vengeance"--hardly a reassuring word from a law 
enforcement official.(25)
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Over the past six years, the remnants of the KGB have shown themselves to be part of 
the organized crime problem,(26) as the Russian Organized Crime Task Force of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies discusses in a recent report.(27)
Former Soviet dissident and post-Soviet lawmaker Sergei Kovalev lays the blame at the 
feet of Boris Yel'tsin. In his January 1996 letter resigning as Yel'tsin's human rights 
commissioner, Kovalev wrote, "You announced, amid much publicity, the start of a fight 
against organized crime in the country. To that end, you gave enormous powers, going 
beyond the bounds of right and the law, to the power structures. The result? Criminals 
still roam free, while law-abiding citizens, without having gained security, are forced to 
tolerate the tyranny of people in uniform into the bargain."(28)
PROMOTION OF CHECHNYA WAR LEADERS
Key officials who authored and executed the Chechnya war have been promoted within 
Russia's security and law enforcement leadership. Among them:
Valentin Korabelnikov served as First Deputy Director of the Main Intelligence 
Administration of the military general staff (GRU), and remained directly involved in 
operations. He was wounded in Chechnya, where he directed spetsnaz operations and 
is reported to have masterminded and supervised the 26 April 1996 assassination of 
Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. Yel'tsin promoted Korabelnikov to become GRU 
director in May 1997.
Anatoli Kulikov was commander of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Internal 
Troops in Chechnya, whose forces committed most of the atrocities. Human rights 
leaders called for him to be tried as a "war criminal" but Yel'tsin promoted Kulikov to 
become Minister of Internal Affairs in July 1995, and in February 1997 named him 
deputy prime minister responsible for most law enforcement and security services.
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Sergei Stepashin, as director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK, now the 
Federal Security Service), was one of the "Party of War" members who initiated the war 
in the autumn of 1994. Yel'tsin fired Stepashin in June 1995 over the mishandling of a 
terrorist incident in which 100 civilians were killed. Despite calls by human rights leaders 
to put him on trial for war crimes, Yel'tsin named Stepashin minister of justice in July 
1997.
Rule of Law
The Soviets maintained Party checks and balances against the state security organs, 
and in 1989, after abolishing the Party's monopoly on political power, created nominal 
oversight committees in the union and Russian Federation parliaments. However, these 
bodies exercised no real oversight authority in practice.
The situation has improved slightly since that time. Today, both houses of the Federal 
Assembly have committees to oversee the security and intelligence services, and the 
budget committees have a limited oversight capability as well. Though the membership 
of these committees is diverse, most of their members have close professional relations 
with the organs, many being retired or reserve MVD, military, or security officers.(29)
The Chechnya war showed how, in practice, no effective checks and balances exist. 
Initial hostilities initiated from Moscow were carried out by covert paramilitary units 
(under the command of state security chief Stepashin) whose creation was explicitly 
forbidden by law. Russian constitutional and legal analyses show that throughout the 
Chechnya conflict, federal forces flagrantly violated the constitution, the already-
generous laws, and international treaties to which Russia was committed. Constitutional 
violations include the arbitrary or otherwise extrajudicial killing of Russian citizens 
(Articles 2 and 20), trampling of internationally recognized human rights (Articles 15 and 
17), denial of legal protection of rights and freedoms (Article 46), and limitations on 
rights and freedoms by extra-legislative means (Articles 55, 56 and 102). The president, 
prime minister, and defense and security officials also violated every major law 
governing the police and security services, including the Law on Defense, the Law on 
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Security, the Law on Operational Work, the Law on Federal Organs of State Security, 
and the Law on the Status of Servicemen.(30)
Conclusion
The situation in 1997 has little in common with the bold vision of Vadim Bakatin in the 
optimistic closing months of 1991. In some ways, Russia is farther today from having a 
national security apparatus accountable to laws than it was during the turmoil of the 
Soviet collapse. In 1991 at least, there was at least some political will to bring the 
system to heel. Today, almost no one speaks of doing away with the KGB legacy. It has 
become part of the post-Soviet landscape.
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